Challenges & opportunities

EXCEPT for the years of hostility during Ayatollah Khomeini’s rule, for much of the period after the Islamic Revolution Saudi Arabia and Iran had reasonably good bilateral relations. The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the death of the hardliner Imam Khomeini in 1989 and, most importantly, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 changed the regional situation and opened up opportunities for Iran to build bridges with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

During the presidencies of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, there was political dialogue, cooperation in regard to energy policies, heightened economic ties, and, above all, a strong bilateral effort to play down the sectarian divide and promote interaction between the ulema (clergy) of Shias and Sunnis, the two sects of Islam. There was a downturn in relations during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mainly owing to his provocative remarks. Even so, he was warmly welcomed to the 2007 GCC summit in Doha, the first occasion Iran was invited thanks to a personal initiative of the Emir of Qatar, and later to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit in Mecca in August 2012. A high-level delegation from Iran attended the OIC summit, and there were no hysterics or walkouts even when close ally Syria’s membership was suspended over Iran’s objections. Later, there was cordial interaction between the Iranian leadership and GCC representatives at the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Tehran in August 2012.

The roots of the present Saudi-Iran divide lie in the regime change in Iraq after the United States’ military intervention in 2003, when “Sunni” rule, however authoritarian and irreligious it might have been, was replaced by Shia governments. From the Saudi perspective, this situation, which suggested the emergence of an incrementally strengthening Iraq-Iran partnership, placed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at a serious strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis Iran.

Against this background, what alarmed Saudi Arabia was the impact of the Arab Spring in Bahrain, when thousands of agitators gathered at the Pearl Square to demand the implementation of a political reform programme that had been promised by the ruler Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa when he ascended the throne in 2002. Although there was no evidence of an Iranian role in the Bahrain agitations, this was immediately and strongly denounced by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as unwarranted and unacceptable Iranian “interference” in Bahrain’s internal affairs.

Saudi concerns about reform in Bahrain were deep-seated, even existential. The Kingdom feared the reverberations that Shia empowerment in Bahrain would have on its own two-million-strong Shia population, which lives mostly in the contiguous eastern province and has been subjected to serious discrimination in the state founded on Wahhabi ideology. Furthermore, it was feared that reform in Bahrain could have a powerful domino effect across the GCC and lead to insistent demands for reform across the region. These concerns led to the dispatch of Saudi and UAE troops to Bahrain as a psychological reassurance to the Bahraini regime. Confrontation was thus set up against Iran, with Saudi Arabia accusing it of seeking regional hegemony on a sectarian and ethnic (Persian) basis. Iran-Saudi competition soon acquired a region-wide sectarian character, as Saudi Arabia challenged Iranian influence across different theatres in West Asia—Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and, above all, Syria.

The Arab Spring led to some public demonstrations in Syria in March 2011 seeking reform in the political order. The demands were not only rejected by President Bashar al-Assad, but he mobilised opposition to the agitators on a sectarian basis by asserting that the demands for reform were an attempt to challenge the Alawite monopoly on power in the country. Saudi Arabia stigmatised the Syrian regime as Shia and seized the opportunity to seek regime change in Syria, being convinced that an alternative Sunni political authority would snap Syria’s strategic ties with Iran, deny the latter its outreach to the Mediterranean, and end Iran’s links to the Hizbollah, thus diluting Iranian influence in Lebanon. These strategic setbacks for Iran would, in Saudi perception, compensate it for the disadvantages it suffered with the regime change in Iraq and the setting up of an Iran-Iraq nexus.

The Syrian scenario is thus no longer about freedom, democracy and dignity. External players such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have come out in open support of the “rebels” by providing funds, arms, training and full logistical support to the militias. Over time, Islamist groups, made up of Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi and Al Qaeda elements, have come to dominate the uprising, warring with each other with the same ferocity that they exhibit against government forces. This has contributed in great measure to converting a limited but evolving internal revolt into a protracted and escalating civil war that has lasted now for over two and a half years in which almost 130,000 people have died, more than five million have been displaced internally, and more than three million have become refugees in neighbouring countries. A large number of historic cities and shrines have been destroyed.

U.S.-Iran thaw

Amidst the growing carnage in Syria, there was a dramatic and unexpected thaw between the U.S. and Iran in November 2013 on the nuclear question, which ended mutual hostility of over 30 years and held out prospects for fundamental changes in the Gulf, West Asian, South Asian and even global scenarios. This thaw emerged from the election of President Hassan Rouhani, who, in contrast to his predecessor, immediately spoke the language of “prudence and hope”. International politics could not be a zero-sum game, he said, and could not function on the basis of blood feuds; he asserted, instead, the central importance of “constructive engagement”. The interim nuclear agreement is to be the first step in a long-drawn attempt to address all issues that have bedevilled ties between Iran and the West, including the harsh sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and imposed on it a near-outcast status.

Already a number of positives in the regional scenario, unthinkable even a few months ago, have emerged. Even while the nuclear agreement with P5+1 (the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany) was under discussion, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stressed the importance of Iran’s ties with the Arab Gulf countries. He assured the latter that the nuclear agreement “cannot be at the expense of any country in the region”, and stressed the importance of good Iran-Saudi ties for the benefit of the Gulf.

Since then, he has visited four of the six GCC countries—Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman—repeating the message of goodwill and camaraderie. He has more than once publicly expressed his wish to visit Saudi Arabia. This improved atmosphere encouraged the GCC summit to issue a statement welcoming the U.S.-Iran breakthrough. Significantly, the UAE Foreign Minister also visited Iran and a positively worded UAE statement was issued.

Again, the use of chemical weapons in a Damascus suburb on August 21 has ironically set off a chain of events that have resulted in a positive outcome: it has led to the U.S. and Russia finally intervening in Syria to stem the bloodletting and focus regional and global attention on a political resolution of this conflict that has ground to a stalemate and has enabled Al Qaeda to consolidate itself in various parts of Syrian territory.

This provides opportunities to envision new scenarios based on accommodation rather than competition and conflict. In this regard, the issue that needs to be addressed most urgently is that of sectarianism. Sectarian bloodletting in Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria has shown its immense destructiveness and its capacity to engulf the entire Muslim community in fratricidal violence for several generations. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have to accept the futility of the sectarian conflict. Once sectarianism is taken out of the equation, Saudi Arabia and Iran will discover numerous areas where they have shared interests —extremism, energy and regional security. Here is where India can play a constructive role.

India’s interests

India has a deep and abiding interest in regional stability. The GCC countries provide 53 per cent of Indian oil imports; they are India’s number one trade partners in terms of economic grouping, and are home to over seven million Indians who send home over $35 billion every year. Taking energy, trade and remittances into account, the financial value of India’s two-way ties with the GCC countries is about $200 billion annually.

If oil supplies from Iran and Iraq are taken into account, India receives 80 per cent of its annual oil imports from the Gulf. In the coming years, as India’s energy demand increases, oil and gas from the Gulf will be central to India’s growth rates and economic development. Besides energy and commerce, Iran is crucial for India’s strategic interests—in terms of its concern with the Afghan political scenario and logistical connectivity to Afghanistan, Central Asia and Russia.

Given the crucial importance of its interests in the Gulf, India had so far rightly opted not to get embroiled in GCC-Iran differences but to separately build strategic, energy and economic ties with all the countries of the region. However, the time has come for India to shed this passive approach and actively engage itself with the promotion of Gulf security. This will emerge for the essential fact that, in spite of the violence and destruction, there has been no winner in the Saudi-Iran strategic and sectarian competition over the last three years. The stage is now set for countries close to both sides to promote engagement and, in time, rapprochement, focussing on the issues that bring them together.

The most important matter in this regard will be regional security—giving assurances to all regional entities that their domestic politics will not be subject to external interference. This will in time pave the way for joint GCC-Iran efforts to address conflicts in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The recent arrest of the Saudi national Majid bin Mohammed al-Majid, the head of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades in Lebanon, said to be responsible for the attack on the Iranian embassy in Beirut in November last year, has brought home to both Iran and Saudi Arabia the grave threat the region as a whole faces from the proliferation of jehadi elements in Syria, Iraq and other parts of West Asia. This, if nothing else, should concentrate the minds of the two Islamic giants to seek an end to their feud and pursue dialogue and rapprochement.

They should also be able to cooperate on energy-related matters, given the long-term implications of the U.S.’ shale “revolution”. Decreasing U.S. dependence on Gulf energy supplies and the U.S. “pivot” to Asia open up the space for new role players with a deep and abiding interest in Gulf security. India’s crucial dependence on Gulf energy supplies makes it imperative for it to be deeply engaged with the region. India is already deeply engaged politically and economically with the GCC countries, and has agreements in place for security and defence cooperation and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, for a “strategic partnership” as set out in the Riyadh Declaration of February 2010.

In order to be able to play an effective role in bridging the Iran-Saudi divide, India has to impart greater dynamism and substance to its ties with Iran. These relations had peaked in 2003, with the visit of President Khatami, when the “New Delhi Declaration” bound the two countries in a strategic partnership. This was preceded by the “Tehran Declaration”, signed during the visit of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2001, in which the two countries affirmed their commitment to “an equitable, pluralistic and cooperative international order” and upheld Iran’s right to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme.

The latter point was echoed in the New Delhi Declaration as well, which included a strong, albeit veiled, criticism of Pakistan for its support for international terrorism, and an attack on the “double standards” of the West in regard to the global fight against terrorism. The two countries had also agreed to expand their strategic role in third countries (namely, Afghanistan) and to collaborate in the areas of sea-lane security, naval exercises, and upgradation of defence systems. At the same time, the two countries recognised that their strategic convergence had to be founded on a “strong economic relationship”.

There can be little doubt that the U.S.-led global concerns relating to Iran’s nuclear weapons programme and the simultaneous upswing in India-U.S. ties, catalysed by the bilateral civil nuclear agreement, steadily diluted the resonance of India-Iran ties so that the two countries drifted apart, with little to show for the promises generated during the Khatami visit.

Now that the U.S. itself is engaged with Iran, there should be little reason for India to show any hesitation in imparting to its ties with Iran the priority and substance they deserve. The first step should be to bolster energy ties—purchasing Iranian oil in increasing quantities and providing Iran with the oil products it urgently requires. Iran used to be the number two oil supplier to India, while India was Iran’s number two market. However, since 2011, Iran has steadily lost this position: in January 2014, Indian imports of Iranian oil were 35 per cent less than in the corresponding period last year. China, on the other hand, though Iran’s largest importer, has made the least cuts: in January-November 2013, its imports were just 1.7 per cent less than in the same period last year. Similarly, from 2000-01, India had become a major supplier of oil products to Iran, which constituted over 40 per cent of the total Indian exports in 2008-09; in response to sanctions, oil products became 1 per cent of India’s exports to Iran.

In anticipation of the gradual easing of sanctions, Iran has announced plans to increase oil production and upgrade its hydrocarbons sector: exports in 2014 are likely to be 1.4 million barrels a day (mbd) as against 1.15 mbd in 2013. Iran is also expected to embark on the development of its major oilfields at Azadegan and Yadavaran and further develop its offshore gas reserves, besides enhancing production at its mature fields and exploring new fields. In this effort, it will require significant investments as also technical expertise and qualified personnel, all of which India is well placed to provide.

In 2005, there were several agreements on India-Iran hydrocarbon cooperation, including upgradation of refineries, purchase of LNG, swap arrangements for the purchase of oil in return for oilfield developments, etc. None of these proposals were actually implemented, and both sides are to blame for this. Given that Iran is at present already in dialogue with Western oil majors and is negotiating an agreement with Russia to swap equipment and goods valued at $18 billion for the purchase of 0.5 mbd of Iranian oil, India, as a neighbour with long-term mutually beneficial economic and strategic interests, should not be found wanting in enthusiasm and imagination.

The visit of External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid to Iran in May 2013 affirmed India’s strategic interests in cooperating with Iran in Afghanistan and the development of the transport corridors from the Gulf to Afghanistan and Central Asia. In this context, it is important to note that both Iran and India have excellent relations with Oman. It is well known that Oman, and Sultan Qaboos bin Said personally, played a crucial role throughout the past year in building the foundations which ultimately led to the breakthrough between the U.S. and Iran. An agreement has been signed between Oman and Iran for the supply of Iranian gas to Oman through an undersea pipeline. The presumption is that technology for this purpose is now available and that the pipeline is economically feasible. If this is the case, then a direct India and Iran undersea gas pipeline could also be considered. Alternatively, the original 1993 proposal of an undersea Oman-India gas pipeline could be revived, through which Iranian gas can come to India via Oman, bypassing Pakistan. An agreement has also been signed between Oman, Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan to develop a transport and economic corridor from Chabahar port northwards and eastwards. India would be a very valuable partner in this project.

The early commencement of dialogue between India and Iran on the regional situation will enable both sides also to focus attention on strategic issues of interest to both sides and define the basis on which India can play a catalytic role in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia together once again.

Source:Front line

Return of the state

IT IS the sort of debate that should, in fact, be taking place in India as it dips its toes into the hot waters of global capitalism, but until it does, let us hear it from the Europeans who, chastened by the 2008 economic crisis and still reeling from its effects, are wrestling with ideas to tame market forces.

The current debate is different from the one that immediately followed the banking crash when capitalism was declared dead, and sales of Das Kapital shot up. This one is not about jettisoning capitalism but making it work for ordinary people. It is about fairer wages, saner prices, affordable housing, and flexible family-friendly employment models. And unlike the post-2008 theoretical musings that left the general public cold, the ideas being discussed now have a resonance for people as they are able to relate to them.

In Britain, it has been dubbed the “standards of living’’ debate. Somewhat ironically, it is led by the Labour Party, which under Tony Blair famously argued that there was nothing to be embarrassed about being greedy. Labour, of course, was not alone in echoing the “greed is good’’ philosophy propagated by Gordon Gekko, the fictional fire-eating stockbroker in the film Wall Street. That was the settled view of much of the British political establishment.

But that was then. Today, the line is about protecting the “little guy’’ from corporate greed and its more overt manifestations. This, in fact, lies at the heart of the current discussion. For the first time, there is serious talk about confronting powerful businesses and holding them to account for their sharp practices.

Moves are afoot to curb excessive profits; break up monopolies; crack down on cartels; freeze prices of essential goods and services; force employers to pay “real’’ wages linked to the cost of living index and inflation; and stop such exploitative practices as “zero hour’’ contracts which allow them to keep workers at their beck and call.

In a sign as to where the debate is heading, six big energy firms, including British Gas, which controls the largest share of Britain’s domestic gas supply market, have been put under investigation over their seemingly excessive profit margins. The government has asked the competition watchdog to investigate their profits and asked it to consider all possible remedies, “including a break-up of any companies found to have monopoly power to the detriment of the consumer”.

“This is a significant issue for consumers out there who are struggling with their energy bills,” Energy Secretary Ed Davey said.

Banks are under growing pressure to reform and become more people-friendly or face crackdown. Labour leader Ed Miliband has proposed breaking up large banks and capping their market share to create greater competition so that customers have more varied choice. This follows widespread complaints about banking giants abusing their dominant positions and short-changing customers. In a major scandal, some of Britain’s biggest banks were found to have colluded to rig interest rates and “mis-sell’’ products such as payment protection policies to unsuspecting depositors.

The European Union has announced a series of measures to rein in the banking sector, including a cap on bankers’ bonuses. And the new tough approach seems to be working. Figures just published reveal that nearly 6,000 bankers, brokers and financial advisers have been sacked or suspended for “rogue’’ conduct in the past six years in Britain alone—amounting to “three every day’’, The Times pointed out.

The assault on banks is part of a larger campaign said to be designed to shape a “new economy’’ aimed at easing the “cost of living crisis’’ facing millions of common people affected by deficit-reduction policies in the wake of the financial crisis. As Miliband explained in a BBC interview, it is “about millions of middle-class families who never dreamt that life would be such a struggle”.

“Indeed, the greatest challenge for our generation is how to tackle a crisis in living standards that has now become a crisis of confidence for middle-class families,” he said, committing the next Labour government to a pro-consumer agenda.

“Unless you bring the consumer into the heart of these things, we are not going to get the change we need,” he said.

It is not only large multinationals and banks that find themselves on the mat. The entire corporate sector is under unprecedented scrutiny. For example, property developers who amass profits by simply sitting on their land and creating an artificial housing shortage have been put on notice. Either they build or risk forfeiting their land. Even individual property owners responsible for pushing up house prices are under pressure. There are calls for absentee landlords—mostly rich foreigners who buy property simply as good investment—to be slapped with extra tax.

The concern that personal greed in the name of free market and individual choice has gone too far is no longer restricted to the usual suspects on the Left. Consider this quote: “If you buy a property and don’t live in it, those are the people who should be taxed. Where you have an economy where the gap gets bigger and bigger between the rich and the poor, you have a big problem.”

It is not a left-wing politician talking but one of Britain’s richest businesswomen, the interior designer Kelly Hoppen.

State intervention in economic activity, once suspiciously regarded as “socialism through the back door’’, is now kosher. The Conservative Party, which came to power vowing to roll back the state, has had a Damascene conversion and is now championing the state’s role in defending the interests of the working class and the “squeezed’’ middle class threatened by arbitrary market forces. In an extraordinary intervention in the housing market, the Conservative-led government has launched a generous scheme to help people get on to the property ladder at a time when banks are reluctant to lend to those who do not have deep pockets.

Under the Help-to-Buy scheme, banks are being forced to change their mortgage policies. Now anyone who can put up a 5 per cent deposit against the value of the property is eligible for a bank loan. In return the government is guaranteeing to pay the lender up to 15 per cent of the value of the mortgage if the borrower defaults on the loan. Not surprisingly, the scheme has become hugely popular even as it has prompted fears of another housing bubble.

In another proactive move, it is aggressively pursuing private employers and pressing them to help unemployed youth find work by hiring them as apprentices and training them for specific jobs. In some cases, it is even paying companies to take on apprentices. Rather than being rolled back, the state is being rolled out into more and more areas hitherto regarded as spheres where the government had no business poking its nose.

On the face of it, these may seem like desperate measures to cope with a difficult situation, but in reality they represent a profound philosophical shift. The traditional hands-off approach to free market economy is giving way to state activism on a scale that would have been unimaginable a few years ago. The notion that deregulation, aggressive private enterprise and let-the-fittest-survive are the cornerstone of a vibrant market economy is wearing thin as inequalities widen, with a few at the top cornering all the benefits.

What is happening is a fundamental “reimagining of the purpose and shape of the state”, as one commentator put it. And this is happening not because the political class suddenly has had a “Eureka” moment but because it is under increasing public pressure to address the widening chasm between the top few and the rest of society. It is purely selfish reasons—the fear of a mass backlash and social instability—that is driving politicians. There is then the fear of losing elections. The harsh truth is that for all the money that the “enterprising “ capitalist class may be able to throw at political parties, the power to vote in and vote out governments remains with ordinary people. And these are the people who have been hit the hardest by the six-year-long recession. No wonder they are angry.

When the times were good, everyone had a job, and mortgages could be had for the asking, nobody really minded if a few benefited more from the boom than others. But when the times are hard, as they are now, disparities breed resentment, especially when the only ones who seem to be thriving are those who caused the crisis in the first place. Hence the wave of public outrage that is sweeping Europe with people demanding a systemic change—an end to corporate greed and abuse of the market passed off as free enterprise.

While it is too early to say how far the current debate will result in reining in a runaway economic culture, one thing is certain: it is no longer going to be business as usual.

Source:Frontline

Cairo haunts Riyadh again

Little did Riyadh know that the most severe strategic blow to its regional influence would come not from Tehran, or Tehran's agents in Baghdad — but Cairo, its closest Arab friend. The ousting of Mubarak did not only mean the loss of a strong ally, but the collapse of the old balance of power. The region could no longer be divided on a Riyadh-Cairo v Tehran-Damascus axis. Revolutions have struck in both camps: in “moderate” Egypt and Tunisia, as in “hardline” Damascus and Tripoli. The principal challenge for the Saudi regime is no longer the influence of Syria, Iran or Hezbollah, but the contagion of revolutions.
The Saudis had dispatched troops to the small kingdom of Bahrain to suppress a revolt against the Sunni rule of the Khalifas. And when the Yemeni revolution erupted, they moved to bolster Ali Abdullah Saleh's reign, pumping millions into his coffers to buy off tribal allegiances, and providing his army with equipment, intelligence and logistical support. Although Riyadh's rulers despise Saleh for dragging them into a messy conflict with the Houthis at their southern border in 2009, they have stood by him. But as the revolution raged on, winning the support of most tribes and causing wide defections in the army, the Saudi regime had no choice but to let go of its man in Sana'a — as long as this is perceived not as the fruit of popular pressure, but a smooth power transition within the framework of its own Gulf Co-operation Council proposal. With Saleh's forced exit after Friday's (June 3) attack on his presidential compound, Riyadh is again seeking to wrest the initiative from the street and act as the chief powerbroker in Yemen.
Sparing no expense
Although it has striven for years to isolate Syria from Tehran, it is not too keen on seeing its old enemy collapse under the blows of protesters either — and is now working to protect the Assad regime. King Abdullah has even phoned President Assad to offer “solidarity with Syria against conspiracies targeting its stability and security.”
Saudi Arabia is sparing no expense to contain existing revolutions and suppress potential ones. In spite of its fear of post-revolutionary Egypt, it has recently granted it $4bn in aid to appease its generals; $20bn has been lavished on Bahrain and Oman — another kingdom beset by popular unrest — with $400m donated to Jordan.
To Riyadh, Arab revolutions set a dangerous precedent for the subjects of monarchies, and must, therefore, be averted at all cost. This is the backdrop for Saudi Arabia's invitation to Jordan and Morocco to join the Gulf Co-operation Council, an organisation that ought to be rebranded as the Club of Arab Despotic Monarchies. Jordan, known for its powerful security apparatus, could act as a useful buffer against revolutionary penetration from Levantine Syria. As for Morocco — whose membership invitation has baffled many, located as it is at the far end of the Arab hemisphere — its principal virtue is its 35 million population, which may compensate for the loss of Riyadh's old heavyweight ally, Egypt.
Monarchy is one characteristic shared by Jordan and Morocco. Economic need is another. Their fragile economies, crippled by debt and corruption, constitute an advantage in the eyes of Saudi strategists, rendering them more amenable to bribery and manipulation.
Riyadh has been watching anxiously as demands for reform escalate. In Jordan, demonstrations have even spread into the tribal south, the regime's traditional support base. A broad alliance of Islamists and leftists has formed after the resignation of two ministers over a graft case. As the alliance's leader, Ahmad Obeidat, put it: “Tyranny and corruption are Jordan's main problems. Fighting corruption starts with reforming the regime itself.” The same state of political mobilisation characterises Morocco — north Africa's only kingdom. The February 20 youth movement has held weekly demonstrations for constitutional reform. Human rights groups report a mass arrest campaign, and regular torture. Police brutality is such that Kamal al-Ammari, a pro-democracy activist, was beaten to death at a pro—democracy rally last week in the southern city of Safa.
By trying to fortify these monarchies, Saudi Arabia is seeking not only to protect them, but preserve itself. The domino effect — one republic after another consumed by revolution — must not be allowed to strike a monarchy. The message is clear: revolutions are a strictly republican phenomenon to which kingdoms are immune. But the goal is to keep reform at bay too. There can be no talk of constitutional monarchies.
Although the Saudi regime is preoccupied by the Iranian threat, its eye is now focused on Egypt and the Arab revolutions, existing and potential. There is nothing that it dreads more than a return to the 1950s and 60s scenario of Cairo spearheading a revolutionary Arab world against pro-American conservative kingdoms. Riyadh is in the process of reproducing the 1955 Baghdad pact, forged in confrontation with Nasser and his revolutionary officers and bringing together the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Jordan (both unofficially), Pahlavi Iran and royal Iraq, as well as Turkey and Pakistan. Some of the players have been replaced, and nationalism has made way for Islamism, but the structure of the strategic game is the same.
And so is its mightiest weapon: money. In a battle where internal fears coincide with external interests, Riyadh is resuming its old role as the vanguard of a cold war against change.

India-Africa summit: from agreement to action

When Dr. Manmohan Singh was the Secretary General of South Commission over two decades back, he worked with its chairman Julius Nyerere, a respected African leader and the former President of Tanzania. This relationship might have moulded Dr. Singh's perceptions on challenges facing Africa and how India should partner with it to secure a multi-dimensional partnership benefitting both sides. This explains, at least partly, why the second India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS-II), followed by the Prime Minister's bilateral visits to Ethiopia and Tanzania, represents the high water mark in India's engagement with Africa. The recent safari may owe much to the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. But, above all, it was a well-designed initiative by Dr. Singh's team to position India-Africa relations in the specific context of 21st century.
Backdrop
As Prime Minister, Dr. Singh travelled to South Africa in late 2006 to deepen bilateral relations and inaugurate the centenary celebrations of Satyagraha, the unique movement launched by Gandhiji in 1906. This was followed in 2007 by his rare bilateral visit to Nigeria and a brief sojourn in South Africa where he attended the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Summit. In November of that year he visited the continent again to attend the Commonwealth Summit in Kampala. In April 2008, he hosted the historic summit, IAFS-I, in Delhi that heralded the commencement of institutionalised interaction with Africa, injecting new momentum into an old relationship. Throughout 2010, India hosted numerous African dignitaries.
The political will and commitment to build ties afresh with Africa have thus been on display in abundance under Dr. Singh's leadership. This backdrop points to why he enjoys special empathy with African leaders. Echoing their sentiments, Kgalema Motlante, South Africa's Vice-President, articulated his belief in Addis Ababa that the India-Africa equation “is and should remain a mutually beneficial strategic partnership.”
Key questions
Despite ample coverage of IAFS-II, several questions demand objective answers. Was the summit well organised? What are its key outcomes? Does Africa look at India in isolation or within a rapidly changing global context? What are the prospects of a timely implementation of Addis Ababa decisions? And, finally, how would the engagement look like in 2014 when the third summit takes place?
The first question is the easiest to answer. Thanks to careful preparations in recent months and notable synergy created between Indian and African Union officials, the second summit was managed adroitly. It was helped by the absence of controversial or divisive issues. What the planners did exceptionally well was to choreograph a series of productive interactions involving not just officials and political leaders but also other segments of the target constituency — entrepreneurs, CEOs, media figures, academics, civil society, artistes and craftsmen. While taking a leaf out of the first Summit, they managed to take the B-to-B and P-to-P exchanges to new heights.
As to the key outcomes, the Addis Ababa Declaration and the Framework for Enhanced Cooperation bring out clearly that a striking convergence of views exists between India and Africa not only on bilateral matters but also on a whole range of issues. These include U.N. reforms, Africa's place in world affairs, climate change, countering terrorism, the Doha Round and South-South cooperation.
What analysts were keen to know was whether the areas of cooperation identified in 2008 would now be modified substantially, and whether India would demonstrate further financial generosity to fund new programmes. The set of seven areas chosen in 2008 remains unchanged, but details of some of them have undergone a transformation. The Prime Minister's business-like announcement of new funding for additional commitments — $5 billion for lines of credit, $700 million for new institutions and training programmes, and $300 million for the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway line — was an apt response to African expectations.
India has made it clear that capacity building would receive priority in its endeavour to deepen links with Africa at the continental, regional and bilateral levels. However, the other two pillars of its strategy, namely trade and investment cooperation and infrastructure development too would be pushed hard. On trade, further clarity and a more targeted promotion are required. A duty-free tariff regime offered by India is yet to work optimally. Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) negotiations such as with Southern African Customs Union (SACU) seem to be moving slowly. However, the enhanced focus on infrastructure is significant. India is not leaving this field to others, engaged as it is in building roads, railways, ports and bridges. But Africa's appetite is huge: the World Bank has recently estimated that Africa needs $93 billion a year to address the infrastructure gap. For creating new opportunities for Indian companies, the government has no option but to find new methods to finance projects in future.
India-China competition?
As regards the next question, many diplomatic and scholarly voices have been heard on whether there is competition, race or rivalry between India and China for seeking a place under the African sun. Delhi's official view is unmistakable: there is no competition. Significantly, Beijing has not expressed any view. Within Africa, there are many who believe not only in the existence of competition, but also in its desirability. Western observers and scholars have, of course, been the main proponents of the theory that India-China competition in Africa has been heating up.
Whatever may be one's preferred conclusion, it can be asserted that healthy competition is generally good, not bad, and that even though the Indian and Chinese approaches are quite different, they exhibit a few similarities too. If at macro level the India-China relationship is widely seen to have three fundamental characteristics, i.e. competition, cooperation and conflict, it is hardly plausible to argue that these traits would not be unfolding in Africa.
Further, neither India nor China can afford to ignore monitoring each other's activities in Africa and drawing lessons from them. Given the fact that Africa, despite its intrinsic unity, is a diverse continent of 54 — soon to be 55 — nation-states, India and China as well as the Western and other powers would have a role to play on the African stage.
Future prospects
The last two questions pertaining to implementation are inter-related. The 19 institutions that India had proposed to establish in accordance with the 2008 Summit decisions are yet to see light of the day, but hopefully they will do so soon, probably within a year from now. The package of new institutions announced in Addis Ababa is no doubt impressive, but it will need a longer gestation period and a lot of hard work.
South Block would make a huge contribution to the India-Africa cooperation if it quickly crafts a tight calendar for fulfilling the Prime Minister's promises. Let 2014, the year of the third summit, be the final, non-negotiable deadline when all the proposed institutions become a reality. An essential pre-requisite: External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna should consider deploying an A-team of officers as the Africa desk undergoes important changes in the coming weeks. Should this happen and if promised funding is spent purposefully, the substance and profile of India's partnership with Africa are set to grow tremendously.
But, enhancing cooperation is a shared dream, working for it a joint responsibility. Leaders and other drivers on both sides of the Indian Ocean need to rise to the occasion.

Mali tackles ills — Al-Qaeda and drug trafficking

The tourism minister of Mali, N'Diaye Bah, visibly bristled when asked about the possibility that Al-Qaeda's North African offshoot might kidnap foreigners in fabled Timbuktu or anywhere across Mali's northern desert.
France spread such rumours, he insisted. “They want to create this security issue that does not exist,” he said, wagging his finger. “When you come to Mali, there is no aggression against tourists. How can you say there is insecurity in this country?”
Yet the United States and French Embassies, among other foreign missions, explicitly warn against travelling to Timbuktu and indeed the entire desert that sweeps across roughly two-thirds of this landlocked West African nation. A French Embassy map colours the entire north red, a no-go area.
This uneasy, public standoff has existed for some time, reflective of Mali's insistence that it is not a font of violence like some of its neighbours, notably Algeria. But in a sign that Mali both acknowledges the issue and seeks to address it, the country is rolling out a new development plan, hoping to tackle the problem at its roots.
The problems
The dearth of jobs and prospects in the north helps drive the region's twin ills — narcotics trafficking and Islamic radicalism. By setting up military barracks, infirmaries, schools, shopping areas and animal markets in 11 northern towns, the Malian government hopes to establish a more visible government presence, foster economic activity and form a bulwark against lawlessness.
“The ultimate goal of the project is to eradicate” Al-Qaeda's affiliates in Mali, said Adam Tchiam, a leading Malian columnist.
Mali does not deny that an estimated 200 to 300 fighters from Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (Maghreb being the Arabic term for west) have found a perch in their desert, although most are believed to be Mauritanians and Algerians. But Mali often depicts the terrorists as a problem generated elsewhere.
“We are hostages to a situation that does not concern us,” news reports quoted President Amadou Toumani Touré as saying.
Behind the scenes, however, the President has been more forthcoming. In a meeting with the American Ambassador, Gillian A. Milovanovic, and senior American military officers last year, he said the extremists “have had difficulty getting their message across to a generally reluctant population,” according to an embassy cable obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to several news organisations. Still, Mr. Touré acknowledged, “they have had some success in enlisting disaffected youth to their ranks.”
Trail of violence
In recent years, the Qaeda affiliate has left a trail of violence across Mauritania, Niger, Algeria and Mali, taking aim at tourists, expatriate workers, local residents and security forces. Hostages taken in the porous border regions have been executed or ransomed. Five French and two African workers kidnapped in Niger last September are believed to be held in northern Mali.
The Algerians and some Western diplomats accuse the Malians of being too soft on terrorism, an opinion reflected in the cables obtained by WikiLeaks. But Mali's defenders argue that the regional problem is far larger than any one poor country can address.
To that end, Mauritania recently moved uninvited troops permanently across the border in Mali to eradicate a Qaeda encampment, diplomats said, and Mali did not object.
For his part, President Touré has been trying to forge a regional consensus on the issue, but the leaked cables and diplomats suggest that Algeria has been reluctant to take part. Algerian officials regularly criticise the presence of French and American training forces, saying they constitute another threat.
Mali's own plan faces two main problems, one domestic and one foreign. Tuareg rebels fought the government in the desert for decades, with the 1992 peace treaty specifying that the government forces completely withdraw from the north. Deploying them there risks reigniting a conflict that still simmers.
Even so, some northerners endorse almost any government action in the harsh environment, where battling sand alone constitutes a daily struggle.
“There are villages that have never seen an administrator, never seen a nurse, never seen a teacher,” said Amboudi Side Ahmed, a businessman in the capital, Bamako, who was raised in the north. “You could stay in a village up there for 10 years and never see a government official.”
Then there is the question of whether these northern hubs are even feasible, given the reluctance of foreign aid workers to venture north and finance projects there. “The President says the poor protect Al-Qaeda because they do not have any means,” said Mr. Tchiam, the columnist. “Where are the means?”
While foreign governments recognise that the north needs development, the lack of security hampers it. American Embassy personnel, for example, can travel north only with express permission of the ambassador, which she said she rarely granted.
‘Development is criticial'
“Development is critical in dealing with the north,” Ambassador Milovanovic said, but “so long as security is unstable, it is hard to get those projects going.”
“We cannot just throw money up there.”
After her own visits, she has tried to meet local requests by offering training for midwives or supplying four-wheel-drive ambulances. As part of its broader efforts to counter extremism in northern Mali, the United States also underwrote a series of radio soap operas whose plot twists emphasised the dangers of extremism.
Beyond that, Washington provides basic military training, sometimes even more basic than envisioned. An exercise on what to do when the driver of a vehicle is shot dead revealed a startling truth — most Malian soldiers did not know how to drive. Lessons were instituted. But Malian officials want more.
Terror operations
“How many people in the north listen to the radio? That is never going to be strong enough to change their views on A.Q.M.I. or religious fundamentalism,” said Mohamed Baby, a presidential adviser working on fixing the northern problem, using the initials of the French name for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. “We need to deal with development, with the lack of resources.”
Qaeda fighters have sometimes ingratiated themselves by paying inflated prices for food, fuel and other goods. Diplomats believe that the extremists have also informed local smugglers that they will pay a premium for kidnapped Westerners.
Aside from collecting ransoms for hostages, Al-Qaeda is believed to be financing its operations by exacting tolls from drug smugglers and traffickers in arms, humans and illicit goods. Since at least the 10th century, Timbuktu has been a crossroads for trade routes across the Sahara, and the modern age is no different.
A series of drug-laden planes make the loop from South America to the Sahel, but numbers are elusive, said Alexandre Schmidt of the United Nations drug office. In one notorious 2009 episode, a Boeing 727 believed to have ferried cocaine from Latin America was set on fire after it got stuck in the sand.
Both the drug smugglers and Al-Qaeda offer young men a quick route to money and symbols of prestige like a pickup truck. The government plan has no easy, short-term ways to compete, officials concede.
“They can recruit young people and undermine both the economy and the religion,” Mr. Baby said of the militants. “We have to build up some kind of resistance.”

Ivory Coast: an expert view

A tragedy is unfolding in Ivory Coast that will have regional and international ramifications. More than 100 people have been killed since the election, 16,000 Ivorians have fled to neighbouring Liberia while thousands of others have been internally displaced. Ivory Coast is heading for renewed civil war.
Laurent Gbagbo is internationally isolated, but still not prepared to accept an offer from the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), to make a dignified exit as an elder statesman.
The standoff is the latest crisis since civil war erupted in 2002, splitting the country between north and south.
That conflict was partly over citizenship rights of many residents from the north, and fuelled by youth unemployment caused by the decline of international cocoa prices. A large French military base and French expatriate dominance of many key Ivorian businesses also fed anti-French sentiment.
A 2007 peace deal called for new elections, which were delayed several times before a vote was finally held in October, with a run-off in November.
This crisis is differs from the past, however: the opposition clearly won a significant amount of votes even in Abidjan and France, the former colonial power, is no longer trying to single-handedly influence the outcome.
The only promising aspect of this crisis is the leadership of African institutions. The Economic Community Of West African States (Ecowas) and the AU have suspended Ivory Coast, and supported sanctions and military intervention to remove Gbagbo. The U.S. and EU have slapped their own sanctions on Gbagbo and his inner-circle, while the World Bank and the West African regional central bank have cut financing.
The Jeunes Patriotes youth militia leader, Charles Ble Goude, who has agitated for Gbagbo, is already under U.N. sanctions. In 2006, when I chaired a U.N. sanctions inspection team in Ivory Coast, I saw the temporary calming effect sanctions had on his behaviour; if he unleashes the violence he has promised, he would not only destroy any future chances of running for the Ivorian presidency but risks courting the attention of the International Criminal Court.
Sanction on cocoa?
International markets have reacted to the crisis by pushing up cocoa futures prices to a four-month high, although there is no talk of an immediate sanction on cocoa — Ivory Coast is the world's top cocoa producer. Renewed civil war will further destroy one of Africa's leading economies, affect the region, and possibly divide the country for ever. ( Alex Vines is head of the Africa Programme at the Chatham House international affairs think tank in London.

Libya: in the throes of change

The political survival of Muammar Qadhafi, Libya's strongman for 42 years, is under serious threat. Much of this has to do with the transformation of the opposition, now closing in on the capital Tripoli. It had started an unarmed campaign for change but, in the face of excessive State violence, has transformed itself dramatically into an armed revolutionary movement.
With the uprising raging, and eastern Libya already under opposition control, the regime's survival is now almost out of the equation. Mr. Qadhafi no longer has influential friends within and outside Libya who can bail him out. The question now is how will he go, and what will replace him? Will the regime collapse suddenly, the end brought about by a coup, or will it disappear after a brief civil war, when the debilitating ranks of Mr. Qadhafi's loyal forces, make their last stand to defend Tripoli? Alternatively, could there be an unlikely sting in the tail, which might reveal itself in a war of attrition, between Qadhafi-loyalists, whose numbers and commitment the world has underestimated, and the opposition forces, now rapidly advancing along Libya's eastern Mediterranean coastline towards Tripoli?
Mr. Qadhafi's problems have become insurmountable because he has a very thin support base left. For decades he has not been critically challenged because his regime has adopted a combination of selective tribal patronage and co-option, made possible on account of a windfall in oil revenues, and the fear that police states can instill in their citizens. In the initial years, after the 1969 coup that brought him to power, Mr. Qadhafi's firm commitment, in the footsteps of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, to revolutionary Arab nationalism, did earn him accolades at home. But when the cost of raising legions to enforce Arab unity from Sudan to Palestine became prohibitively high, and hefty oil revenues did not lead to more food on the table, Mr. Qadhafi's social contract with fellow-Libyans began to fray.
The slow accumulation of woes over the last four decades, finally appear to have exploded, leading to his undoing. Some of the resentment has come from the state of the economy. Despite Libya's status as a leading oil exporter, large sections of Libyans live on an income of less than two dollars a day.
Then, there are the forces of sub-nationalism, which refuse to go, partly because Mr. Qadhafi's personality cult, a lack of pluralistic institutions, and a denial of civil liberties that has disallowed Libyan nationalism to flower.
For long, Libya's east, which was a part of the traditional Cyrenaica, as well as the ruling power centre under the regime of King Idris, toppled by Mr. Qadhafi in the 1969 coup, has felt discriminated against. Under Mr. Qadhafi, Tripoli, a part of the old Tripolitania, became the new power centre, and members of the Qadhadfa tribe, to which the leader belongs, and who are dominant in this area, were among the chief beneficiaries of the new regime. It is therefore not surprising that the revolt, on February 15, and reflecting old animosities, began in Benghazi, Libya's capital, pre-1969.
There are also human rights issues and political demands as well, which have been brewing. The rebellion in Libya was sparked by the detention, on February 15, of Fathi Terbil, the 39-year-old human rights lawyer, based in Benghazi. Mr. Terbil represents the families of around 1,000 inmates, who were killed in 1996 by the regime in Tripoli's Abu Slim prison. His detention preceded a planned protest on February 17, in which the families of these inmates were to have participated. The revolt was also preceded by a peaceful two-year campaign for a new constitution, and demands for rule of law by a lawyers' syndicate, based in Benghazi.
Aspirations for economic justice, the rule of law, civil liberties and regional equality, seemed to have all coalesced when the uprisings, led by youth, in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt, had successfully brought down entrenched dictatorships. As in other parts of West Asia and North Africa, these movements have transformed mindsets in Libya, imparting a powerful sense of self-belief, especially among the youth, who have realised that with careful preparation, fundamental political changes are indeed achievable.
Information is still sketchy about the role of the youth in using the internet as a tool for political mobilisation in Libya. “We will hear more about that in the days to come as the haze over the uprising settles. The only thing that I can say with certainty is that cyber-space was hyper-active ahead of the revolt,” says Tarik M. Yousef, a Libyan-American, who is currently the Dean of the Dubai School of Government in the United Arab Emirates. However, it is now emerging that unlike Facebook and Twitter, that Egyptian and Tunisian youth used effectively, some among the Libyan youth, preferred — perhaps to escape the regime's scrutiny — to use a popular football website to plan and organise the protests.
Mr. Qadhafi's slide towards isolation, driven by a combination of deep seated insecurity, and megalomania, began soon after the popular September 1969 coup. Deciding to monopolise power, Mr. Qadhafi, trusting his formidable charismatic powers, ensured that his potential political rivals have remained marginalised. He towered over the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) comprising several military officers, where power was concentrated after the coup. A failed attempt, by Major Umar Mihayshi, a RCC member and 30 army officers, to topple him in 1975, led Mr. Qadhafi to further tighten his grip on power. In the periodic purges that have followed, several hundred people were allegedly killed, in the wake of an unsuccessful army revolt, in 1980, in Tobruk. It is, not surprisingly, one of the flashpoints of the on-going uprising.
Acutely aware of the danger that the armed forces could pose to his survival, the Libyan leader has systematically undermined the power of the conventional army. He has promoted the Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC), an ultra-loyal well equipped force of around 3,000 men, drawn mainly from the Qadhadfa tribal groups surrounding Surt, the leader's hometown. Also called the Jamahiriya Guard, the RGC, formed mainly in the 1980s, was tied to the powerful Revolutionary Committees, another contraption of the regime embedded in work places and communities. The Revolutionary Committee buildings, a prominent regime symbol, were fiercely targeted during the current uprising in Benghazi, before protesters established their control over the city by February 20. Troops sent in to quell the revolt also turned around to join the dissidents. They are now taking the lead in military preparations to counter Mr. Qadhafi's loyalists, as they head towards Tripoli, the leader's stronghold.
In its future confrontations with the regime, the opposition is likely to encounter the Khamis brigade — a highly potent force, which has been assigned the Pretorian guard role in the defence of the regime. It could also encounter legions of mercenaries drawn out of Africa, that Mr. Qadhafi has cultivated for long to fulfill his utopian pan-Arab dreams.
Mr. Qadhafi's emergence as a target of hate-filled vendetta can also be attributed to the offensive doctrine of physical liquidation that his regime has adopted toward its opponents abroad. Some among the Libyan expatriates, who are mostly educated but left the country in droves in the early 1980s, have been lethally targeted for their anti-regime activism abroad. The regime's agents have assassinated many of them, especially those who moved to Western Europe, where they began to raise opposition groups. Given their animosity towards the regime, the expatriates are playing a significant role in fuelling the revolt. Apart from the youth, they have been making active use of the internet to help create the critical mass required for the success of the uprising.
In his aggressive campaign to deepen the “revolution,” Mr. Qadhafi has further alienated the Libyan clergy, now an important element in the revolt. His contention that his “ Green Book,” a self-acclaimed philosophical guide to chart Libya's future, is compatible with Islam and his nationalisation of properties belonging to Islamic endowments had already driven a wedge. The clergy has now formalised its break with the regime. In a statement, the newly formed Network of Free Ulema, which includes 50 prominent Libyan clerics and scholars, on February 22, condemned the use of State-violence against the protesters.
As the momentum gathers against the regime, the participation by ever-larger numbers of tribes has begun to make a critical difference to the regime's survival. In the city of Az-Zintan, 150 kilometres west of Tripoli, the powerful Warfala tribe has turned against Mr. Qadhafi. The Az-Zintan tribe, on its part, is trying to facilitate the entry of youth into Tripoli to challenge the regime. Significantly, around one-third of Tripoli's residents belong to the Tarhun tribe, which is disassociating itself from the government. Cracks are also appearing in the Qadhadfa tribe.
In the end, Mr. Qadhafi is staring at defeat, not necessarily on account of his stated ideals of Arab unity and economic equity, but because of his methods, which have revolved around authoritarianism, a personality cult and the use of brute force. As many among the Egyptian youth have recently shown, soaring idealism has a better chance of realisation when it is premised, not on force, but on principles of transparency, grassroots organisation and a political culture, which readily allows dissent and animated debate.